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Mobile devices have become ubiquitous due to centralization of private user information, contacts, messages
and multiple sensors. Google Android, an open-source mobile Operating System (OS), is currently the mar-
ket leader. Android popularity has motivated the malware authors to employ set of cyber attacks leveraging
code obfuscation techniques. Obfuscation is an action that modifies an application (app) code, preserving
the original semantics and functionality to evade anti-malware. Code obfuscation is a contentious issue.
Theoretical code analysis techniques indicate that, attaining a verifiable and secure obfuscation is impos-
sible. However, obfuscation tools and techniques are popular both among malware developers (to evade
anti-malware) and commercial software developers (protect intellectual rights). We conducted a survey to
uncover answers to concrete and relevant questions concerning Android code obfuscation and protection
techniques. The purpose of this paper is to review code obfuscation and code protection practices, and evalu-
ate efficacy of existing code de-obfuscation tools. In particular, we discuss Android code obfuscation methods,
custom app protection techniques, and various de-obfuscation methods. Furthermore, we review and ana-
lyze the obfuscation techniques used by malware authors to evade analysis efforts. We believe that, there
is a need to investigate efficiency of the defense techniques used for code protection. This survey would be
beneficial to the researchers and practitioners, to understand obfuscation and de-obfuscation techniques to
propose novel solutions on Android.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Code Obfuscation, Dalvik bytecode, Native code, Payloads, Code Pack-
ing, Dynamic loading
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1. INTRODUCTION
ANDROID, the most popular mobile device OS is currently the marketleader [Guardian 2014] [Gartner 2014]. The availability of Internet, Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) and custom apps have increased the popularity of the mobile de-
vices. The official Android market, Google Play is the dominant app distribution plat-
form accessible to all Android devices [Play 2015]. Google Play also allows installation
of third-party developers and app stores [SlideME 2014]. The elevated Android popu-
larity has attracted the attention of malware authors employing advanced code obfus-
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cation and protection techniques. The malware authors are propagating encrypted and
obfuscated premium-rate SMS malware, evading Google Play security [Castillo 2012].
On the other hand, app developers are concerned about code misuse; hence they em-
ploy code obfuscation, encryption and custom protection techniques. The weak code
protection techniques lower the code integrity and escalate the risk of plagiarism and
malware attacks. For instance, a rooted device facilitates identification of app internals
and evades device security.
In software engineering lexicon, reverse engineering is defined as a set of methods
for obtaining the source code from APK archive. The code obfuscation is employed by
malware authors to evade anti-malware. In particular, the architecture-neutral com-
piled Java code is amenable to reverse engineering. The app developers are concerned
about safety and protection of the developed intellectual algorithms and data. Mal-
ware authors use obfuscation, code encryption, dynamic code loading, and native code
execution evading the Google Play protection [Rasthofer et al. 2015a].
Code obfuscation is reported as a reasonable and easy alternative compared to the
other protection techniques [Franz 2010] [Davi et al. 2012]. Code obfuscation is a set
of purposeful techniques to render the code unreadable. Code obfuscation transforms
the code by changing its physical appearance, preserving the intended program logic
and behavior. Furthermore, code obfuscation is useful to protect the software from
reverse engineering. Hence, malware developers have already leveraged the obfusca-
tion by developing recent malware apps evading the Play stores and commercial anti-
malware [Rogers 2014; Minidump 2014]. Android permits app distribution from third-
party developers and other third party app stores. Application developers employ ob-
fuscators to protect the proprietary logic and sensitive algorithms to avoid the misuse.
The code obfuscation techniques can be used to: (i) protect the intellectual property;
(ii) prevent piracy; and (iii) prevent app misuse. The obfuscation techniques employed
by malware authors evade the existing commercial anti-malware solutions. The An-
droid development environment has an in-built obfuscator Proguard [Android 2015b]
for app code protection.
A De-obfuscator is required when app source code is not available. De-obfuscation
can be used to verify correct execution of obfuscated app. A popular app may disguise
as a Trojanwith hidden malicious payload. Zhou et al. [Zhou and Jiang 2012] studied
49 Android malware families and reported more than 86% repackaged malware from
1260 APK files. However, manual analysis is difficult for evaluating 1,490,272 Google
Play apps reported in September 2015 [Appbrains 2015]. There exist several legal and
technical methods to protect the intellectual property of software producers such as
encryption, server-side execution, trusted native code, program encoding, and code ob-
fuscation.
Android is the dominant mobile platform among users and develop-
ers [Guardian 2014]. The open nature of Android allows apps from third-party
developers and other third-party markets. The popularity is an opportunity for pla-
giarists to clone, obfuscate and hijack the popular apps with their trojanized versions.
Code obfuscation and protection techniques can protect the intellectual property.
However, they can also be used to protect malicious code.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss basics
of Android platform, execution mechanism, and its difference with Java development
model. Section 3 covers types and purpose of code obfuscation with an in-depth descrip-
tion of app protection techniques. Section 4 elaborates obfuscation and optimization
tools used by malware authors. In Section 5, we discuss the code protection techniques
used by code packers. In Section 6, we explore the reverse engineering tools used for
de-obfuscating the protected code. Section 8 elaborates the recent trends in obfuscation
and possible future research directions. Finally, in Section 9, we conclude this survey.
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2. ANDROID OVERVIEW
The Android OS is open-source developed by Google and supported by the Open
Handset Alliance (OHA) [Russello et al. 2013; Faruki et al. 2013]. In the following, we
discuss Android OS architecture and app compilation process.
2.1. Android Architecture
The Android software stack has four layers as illustrated in Figure 1: (i) linux kernel;
(ii) native user-space; (iii) application framework; and (iv) application layer. The base
of Android is Linux kernel adapted for limited processing capability, restricted memory
and constrained battery availability. The Android platform customized “vanilla” ker-
nel for resource constrained mobile devices. The Binder driver for inter-process com-
munication (IPC), Android shared memory (ashmem), and wakelocks are important
modifications to suit the Android devices.
Fig. 1: Android Architecture.
Native Space and Application Framework layers form the Android middleware. The
bottom layer blocks are the components developed in C/C++. However, the top two
layers are implemented in Java. Native components are directly executed on the pro-
cessor, bypassing the DVM. Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) is blurred between the
Linux Kernel and Native user-space. Application Framework provides interaction to
the developer. Java classes are compiled into Dalvik executable .dex and interpreted
by the VM. User apps are at the top most layer.
There are many known open-source and commercial tools to reverse engineer the
Android apps. Thus, unprotected apps may unknowingly give away the source code
to the attackers for misuse. Android runs the APK files on Dalvik Virtual Machine
(DVM), a register-based virtual machine to suit the mobile devices [Faruki et al. 2013].
The JVM is a stack-based, whereas, DVM is register-based [Shi et al. 2008]. JVM em-
ploys Last In First Out (LIFO) stack with PUSH and POP operations. The DVM stores
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register-based operands in the CPU registers and requires explicit addressing. Fig-
ure 2 illustrates the procedure of converting Java source code to an APK archive.
2.2. Android Compilation
dx is Android SDK tool that converts Java source code to Dalvik byte-
code [Android 2013]. It merges multiple class files into a single .dex file. Android
manifest stores name and version of the app, libraries, declared permissions, assets,
and other uncompiled resources. The content is merged into a single archive, an
Android application PacKage (APK) [Faruki et al. 2013]. Many open-source and
proprietary tools are available for reverse engineering the application. The unpro-
tected apps may unknowingly give away their source code to the attacker, permitting
visibility to the internals of the APK. The easy availability of source may lead to loss
of revenue, reputation issues, access to intellectual property, and legal liabilities.
Fig. 2: Compilation of Java code to Android APK.
The Android KitKat 4.4 introduced Android RunTime (ART) to replace the DVM.
The new runtime is proposed to improve the Android OS performance. We briefly com-
pare the Dalvik and ART to underline their importance.
(1) Dalvik:
Dalvik VM is the core of Android Dalvik bytecode execution. The Dalvik runtime
is based on the Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation that remains independent of the
machine code. When a user runs an Android app, the .dex code is compiled to the
machine code. Dalvik VM performs JIT compilation and optimization during the
app runtime to improve performance. However, the presence of JIT adds latency
and memory pressure. Though mobile devices are improving their resources, the
new runtime is more efficient in comparison to Dalvik VM.
(2) Android RunTime (ART):
The Android KitKat version 4.4 introduced an optional runtime Android RunTime
(ART) to experimentally replace the DVM to improve performance. In ART, the
APK the bytecode is converted to machine code at install time. Ahead-of-time com-
pilation (AOT), a pre-compilation technique, saves the machine code in persistent
storage. It loads the machine code at runtime, saving the CPU and memory as
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compared to DVM. In particular, the .dex file is compiled as .oat file in ELF for-
mat. The ART reads the .dex file using .dexFile, openDexFileNative from
libart.so library. If the oat file is not found, ART invokes dex2oat tool for com-
piling .dex to .oat. Otherwise, ART loads the .oat file in memory cache map.
Once the .oat file is loaded, ART creates OatFile data structure to store the
information. The ART reduces app startup time as code is converted to native at in-
stall time, which improves battery life. However, the installation takes more time
and space.
3. CODE OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES
Code obfuscation or mutation techniques alter the code appearance in the exist-
ing binary from one generation to another, to evade the anti-malware. Malware au-
thors employ obfuscation techniques to protect malicious logic to evade the anti-
malware [Preda 2007]. The app developers also use obfuscation and code protection
methods to protect the code against reverse engineering. Plagiarist and malware au-
thors employ obfuscation to evade the security tools. Malware authors also employ
obfuscation to plagiarize the popular and paid apps. Obfuscation provides significant
protection and obscures explicit details. Some obfuscation techniques operate directly
on the source code; some obfuscate the bytecode. Collberg et al. classify the obfusca-
tion techniques as: (i) Control-flow; (ii) Data; (iii) Layout; and (iv) Preventive obfus-
cation [Collberg et al. 2002; van Oorschot 2003]. Figure 3 illustrates detailed outline
of existing code obfuscation and protection techniques discussed subsequently. An ob-
fuscator protects the proprietary software and prevents its reverse engineering. The
obfuscated program maintains the semantics of the original app. The original and ob-
fuscated version produce the same output when executed. The malware authors use
code protection and obfuscation techniques to protect malware logic, algorithms and
hide the suspicious information such as strings, domain names and server address to
delay malware being detected.
A de-obfuscator restores the original app from the obfuscated code with reverse en-
gineering tools. The reconstruction of the source may not be possible. For example,
identifier renaming obfuscated variables cannot be restored to their original names
once changed by the obfuscator. According to [Low 1998], code obfuscation or trans-
formation is the most suitable technical protection for type-safe language like Java.
According to Udupa et al. [Udupa et al. 2005], surface obfuscation affects the syntax
of the target program. However, it is not possible to hide the code semantics. If an
identifier is renamed, the program output remains the same. The deep transformation
obfuscates the control flow of target program [Schulz 2014].
Definition: Collberg et al. define the obfuscating transformation as the conversion
τ of a source app A into the target app A′ [Collberg et al. 2002] :
A
τ
−→ A′.
Transformed app A′ is an obfuscated version of the original program A if:
—App A does not terminate, or ends with an error condition, then A′ may or may not
terminate [Collberg et al. 2002].
—Otherwise, A′ must terminate and generate the output similar to A [Collberg 2015].
Android apps are distributed as archive APK files available from: (i) Google Play;
(ii) Third-party app marketplaces; and (iii) Android debug bridge. Once installed, the
apps from the devices can be also accessed with Android Developer Tools (ADT). These
APK files can be reverse engineered to the Dalvik bytecode from classes.dex, the
app executable file. In the following subsection, existing code obfuscation approaches
are detailed according to the outline made in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3: Obfuscation Classification.
3.1. CONTROL FLOW OBFUSCATION
Control flow obfuscation aims to confuse the analyst by breaking up the control flow
of the source code. Functional blocks that belong together are broken apart, and func-
tional blocks that do not belong together are intermingled to confuse the reverse en-
gineering. The control flow transformation changes the execution paths of a program,
still maintains the original functionality. The control flow obfuscation is categorized as
Aggregation, Computation and Ordering obfuscation techniques. The techniques can
be further classified into following sub-categories as illustrated in Figure 3.
3.1.1. Control flow computation . The control flow obfuscation techniques hide the con-
trol flow and append additional code and complicate APK disassembly. The code in-
sertion can be an additional method or irrelevant code [Martinsen 2008]. However,
the recent compilers remove unused code for execution efficiency during the code opti-
mization phase. To counter this, one can insert irrelevant bytecode such as PUSH or POP
within the high-level code. Hence, it is not removed. Computation control obfuscation
can be broken down as described in the following:
(1) Inserting Dead or Irrelevant Code: The dead code block can never be reached;
hence, is never executed. Inserting dead-code statements increases size of code
and analysis time. A programmer can insert code block that is never exe-
cuted [Kovacheva 2013]. For example, one can include extra methods or irrelevant
statement blocks [Stamp and Wong 2006]. For instance, the code snippet before
the Add Dead-code Switch Statements (ADSS) [Faruki et al. 2013] obfuscation is
illustrated in listing 1. The Java bytecode switch construct can be used to insert
control switch that is never executed [Batchelder and Hendren 2007]. However,
the switch increases the connectedness and complexity of the method. Thus, the
obfuscation evades the decompiler that cannot remove the dead switch. Listing 2
illustrates the ADSS obfuscation [Batchelder and Hendren 2007].
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1 //before ADSS obfuscation
2 if (writeImage != null) {
3 try {
4
5 File file = new File("out");
6 ImageIO.write(writeImage, "png", file);
7 }
8 catch (Exception e) {
9 System.exit(1);
10 }
11 }
12 System.exit(0);
Listing 1: before ADSS obfuscation
// ADSS obfuscated code
if(obj != null) {
try {
ImageIO.write((RenderedImage)obj,png,
new File(out));
}
catch(Exception exception2) {
i += 2;
System.exit(1);
}
}
label_167:
{ while(lI1.booleanValue() == ___)
{ switch (i) {
default: break;
case 3: break label_167;
System.exit(1);
continue;
}
}
System.exit(0);
}
Listing 2: ADSS obfuscated
code [Mcgill 2015]
(2) Extend Loop condition: Rewriting the test condition as a complex loop function
introduces obfuscation in the code. It can be accomplished by extending the loop
condition with the addition of more test cases having no effect on the result. The
code in Listing 4 illustrates the extension of a simple if condition.
1 // Before loop extension
2
3 int x = 1;
4
5 if (x > 200)
6 {
7 ...
8 x ++;
9 Foo(x)
10 }
Listing 3: code before Loop extension
// After loop extension obfuscation
int x = 1;
while (x> 200 || x%200==0)
{
...
x ++;
// calling function
Foo(x)
}
Listing 4: Loop extension obfuscation
(3) Reducible to Non-Reducible flow-graph obfuscation (RNR) [Collberg 2015]: A
reducible flow graph can be made complex by turning it reducible to non-reducible.
The Java bytecode has a goto instruction. However, the Java language does not
have a corresponding goto statement [freepatents 2015]. Hence, a plagiarist
can misuse the goto bytecode and obfuscate with an arbitrary control-flow
transformation. Java language can only express a structured control flow. Hence,
“the control flow graphs produced by the Java programs is always reducible.
However, Java bytecode can express this as non-reducible flow graphs, thus
obfuscating reducible flow graph to non-reducible” [freepatents 2015]. According
to [Collberg et al. 2002], this is achieved by converting a structured loop into a loop
with multiple headers. Listing 5 and 6 illustrate the effect of RNR obfuscation.
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1 // Before:
2
3 Statement 1;
4 while (condition1)
5 {
6
7 Statement2;
8 }
Listing 5: before RNR Obfuscation.
// After:
Statement 1;
if(condition2) {
Statement2;
while(condition1){
Statement2;
}
else {
while(condition1){
Statement2;
}
}
Listing 6: RNR Obfuscated code.
(4) Add Redundant Operands: Appending insignificant terms within the code during
basic calculations hinders reverse engineering. For example, let us assume an in-
teger variable p which stores the product of two integer variables a and b. The code
listings 7 and 8 illustrates the code snippets before and after redundant operators
obfuscation. The transformed code generates exactly the same output. However,
the obfuscated snippet appears complex during the analysis.
1 //original code
2
3 public int sum{
4
5 int a,b = 5, 7;
6 int p;
7 p = a * b;
8 System.out.println(‘‘Product =’’ + p);
9
10 }
Listing 7: before redundant operators
//Redundant Operators Obfuscation
public int sum{
int a,b = 5,7;
double i,j = 0.0005, 0.0007;
double p;
p = (a * b) + (i*j);
System.out.println(‘‘Product =’’+ (int) p);
}
Listing 8: redundant operators
(5) Parallelize Code: The introduction of threads can affect the readability due to
increased code complexity. The parallelization improves the performance. How-
ever, the motivation in this case is to hide the correct code flow. Collberg et
al. [Collberg et al. 2002] suggested the following techniques: (i) Creating dummy
processes; or (ii) Splitting sequential sections of a program into multiple concur-
rent and parallel processes.
3.1.2. Control-flow Aggregation (CFA) . The CFA alters the program statements group-
ing [Plasmans 2005]. CFA can be further classified into:
(1) Inline and Outline methods: In Java, replacing a method call by its actual body
(inlining) make the code complicated and difficult to understand. Code optimizers
use these techniques. It also is a useful obfuscation transformation. Code inlining
removes procedural abstraction from the program. Conversely, outlining selects a
group of statements in a procedure and re-use them to generate a sub-procedure.
For instance, inlining two procedures A and B necessitates the calling one after the
other and outlining a portion of the combined code inside a new procedure.
(2) Method Interleaving (MI): Identifying an interleaved method is a difficult reverse
engineering task. MI merges the body and parameter list of different methods.
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Furthermore, it adds parameter to discriminate between calls to the individual
methods [Collberg et al. 2002; Collberg 2015; freepatents 2015].
(3) Method Cloning (MC): A reverse engineer examines the body and signature of a
subroutine to determine code functionality, a necessary step for reverse engineer-
ing. One can create function clones and further introduce repetitive calls to such
functions.
(4) Loop Transformations (LT): In [Collberg et al. 2002], authors observed that some
transformations increase the code complexity. Such obfuscation techniques break
down the iteration space to fit the inner loop cache [Collberg 2015]. The availability
of compile-time loop bounds turns the loop to a compound body with several loops
known as loop fission [Collberg 2015].
3.1.3. Control-flow ordering (CFO). Control flow ordering obfuscation changes the ex-
ecution order of the code statements. For instance, loops can be iterated backward
rather than forward. Control ordering obfuscations can be categorized into:
(1) Reorder Statements and Expressions (RSE): Changing the order of statements and
expressions has a significant effect on the Dalvik bytecode. It can disrupt the link
between Java source and corresponding Dalvik bytecode [Kovacheva 2013].
(2) Reorder Loop (RL): RL transformation can be run backward to confuse the analy-
sis. Code Listing 9 and 10 illustrate the usage of loop reversal obfuscation.
1 // Original code
2 x = 0;
3 while (x < maxNum){
4 i[x] += j[x];
5 x++;
6 }
Listing 9: before loop reversal
// Loop reversal to change the control flow
x = maxNum;
while (x > 0)
{
x--;
i[x] += j[x];
}
Listing 10: loop reversal obfuscation
3.1.4. Control-flow flattening (CFF). CFF transforms the source code such that
static analysis cannot determine the targets of branches. In this technique, the
basic blocks of a program have same predecessor and successor. During execution,
the actual control flow is controlled by a dispatch variable. A switch block has dis-
patch variable and a jump table to switch indirectly towards intended successor.
At runtime, the value of dispatch variable decides which code block to be executed
next. Figure 4(a) illustrates the control-flow graph of Listing 11 and Figure 4(b)
shows the flattened control flow of the mentioned program. Compilers primarily
use such methods during code optimization. However, malware authors leverage
this technique to hide the semantic as well as syntax structure of a malware APK.
This obfuscation technique prevents or at least delays manual analysis.
1 public int fill( int a , int b )
2 {
3 int diff = 0;
4 if ( a > b ) { diff = a-b ;
5 do
6 { b ++;
7 } while ( a ! = b ) ;
8 }
9 else { diff = b-a ;
10 do { a ++;
11 } while ( a ! = b ) }
12 return diff ;
13 }
Listing 11: control flow flattening
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Fig. 4: CFG of listing 11
3.2. DATA OBFUSCATION
Data obfuscation techniques can modify the structure of an APK. They can be clas-
sified into following sub-categories as illustrated in Figure 3.
3.2.1. Data aggregation. This obfuscation changes the data grouping. In the fol-
lowing, we list some sub-categories of this technique:
(a) Merging Scalar Variables: This obfuscation involves merging two or more
scalar variables into a single variable. For example, m scalar variables Var1,
Var2,Var3,..,Vark can be merged into a single array variable Varm. Variables,
in a way similar to arrays or integers, can be merged or even promoted as ob-
jects [Collberg et al. 2002; Collberg 2015; freepatents 2015]. As a simple exam-
ple, consider merging two 32-bit integer variables X and Y into a 64-bit variable
Z.
(b) Class Transformations (CT): Class transformations can be leveraged to make
the program analysis difficult. One good way of achieving this is to use inher-
itance and interfaces to create deep class hierarchies to build a complex dis-
tributed application. Further, one or more dummy classes/methods can confuse
the reverse engineer.
(c) Array Transformations (AT): Array transformation is an effective obfus-
cation technique to convert the readable string information as unread-
able [Collberg 2015]. The AT: (i) splits an array; (ii) merge two or more arrays;
(iii) flattens an array dimensions; or (iv) folds or increases the array dimen-
sions.
3.2.2. Data Storage and Encoding (DSE). The DSE affects how the data is stored
and interpreted. Such methods obscure the data structures within the programs.
Data storage obfuscation converts a local variable into a global. Furthermore, data
encoding obfuscations replaces an integer variable i with an expression x*i+y. In
the following, we discuss such techniques.
(a) Change Encoding (CE): Programmers follow some standard conventions to
write code. The encoding transformation techniques exploit this fact. The more
transformations we employ, the less likelihood to understand the code. In fact,
changing encoding reshapes the data into less natural forms. For example,
we can replace all the references initializing an index variable i, with the
expression i= x*i+y, where x=6 and y=5. When the code needs to use the
index value, the obfuscator inserts the expression (i-5)/6. Finally, instead
of incrementing the variable by one, add six to the value. The obfuscation
scales and offsets the index from the desired value to compute the real index.
Listings 12 and 13 illustrates encoding.
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1 //Before:
2 int i = 1;
3 while (i <= 100)
4 {
5 result = arr[i-1];
6 i++;
7 }
Listing 12: before encoding obfus-
cation
1 //After:
2 int i = 11;
3 while (i <= 605)
4 { result = arr[(i-5)/6];
5 i+=6;
6 }
Listing 13: After encoding obfusca-
tion
(b) Class Transformations: Class transformations can be leveraged to make the
program analysis difficult. One good way of achieving this is to use inheritance
and interfaces to create deep class hierarchies that make it more difficult to
understand the application. Inserting a bogus class can confuse the reverse
engineer.
(c) Array Transformations: There exist many different types of transformations
that can be devised to obscure the operations performed on an array. These
transformations consist of splitting an array, merging two or more arrays, flat-
tening an array (i.e., decrease the dimensions of the array), and folding the
array (i.e., increase the dimensions of the array).
The data modification techniques can be used to evade the string based malware
detectors. A simple example illustrated in Listing 14 and 15 demonstrates data
modification obfuscation.
1 // original declaration
2 int a = 30 .
Listing 14: before integer obfusca-
tion
1 // obfuscating integer declaration
2 class bar {
3 public int getValue () {
4 return 30; }
5 }
6 Foo f = new bar () ;
7 int a = f.getValue () ;
Listing 15: after integer obfusca-
tion
(3) Split Variables (SV): Boolean variables can be replaced by a boolean expression.
The relevant example is illustrated in Table I. Variable b in the original code is
expressed asf(b1, b2). In this example, function F is XOR. However, it can be gener-
alized to any function with any number of variables. This also adds another layer
of obfuscation due to the fact that some assignments of a value have different re-
sults. Let us say b = True. We can further split the variable into b1 = 0 and b2 = 1
in the lookup Table I and convert it to original Boolean value.
b1 b2 b=F (b1 ⊕ b2)
0 0 False
0 1 True
1 0 True
1 1 False
Table I: Lookup table to split variables [Gupta 2005]
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To split the variable b into b1 and b2, we have to define: (i) a function, F (b1, b2) that
maps b1 and b2 to variable b, (ii) to the inverse function, F
-1(b) that maps b to b1 and
b2, and (iii) new operations defined on b1 and b2. b has been split into two shorter
integer variables b1 and b2. If b1=b2=0 or b1=b2=1 then b is false, otherwise, b is True.
Boolean b are masked as arithmetic operations on the integers b1 and b2 with the
split variable technique [Gupta 2005].
(4) Convert Static to Procedural Data: Strings store critical information such as copy-
right information, license key, and software expiry date. If the static string infor-
mation is converted to procedural data, reverse engineering becomes complicated.
A simple way obfuscate is to convert the string to a program that computes the
string [Wroblewski 2002].
3.2.3. Data Ordering. This obfuscation alters the data ordering. Ordering transfor-
mation randomizes data declaration order within a program. “An array stores a
list of integer numbers. The array has the i-th element in the list at position i.
A function f(i) can be used to determine the position of the i-th element in the
list” [Preda 2007; Low 1998]. Randomizing the declaration order impedes reverse en-
gineering process [Low 1998; Stamp and Wong 2006].
(1) ReorderMethods: randomize the declarations of methods within the code to harden
the reverse engineering.
(2) Reorder Arrays: randomize the order of parameters to methods and use a mapping
function to reorder data within arrays.
(3) Reorder Instance Variables: randomize the declarations of instance variables
within the class.
1 // original code
2 int a = 7 + 70/2 + 1 ;
3 int b = "testing".length();
Listing 16: before aggregation
// obfuscated code
int a = 43;
int b = 7;
Listing 17: aggregation obfuscation
3.3. LAYOUT OBFUSCATION
Layout transformation is used to modify the source and binary structure of a pro-
gram. Different layout transformation techniques are illustrated in Figure 3. The
Layout Obfuscation can be classified as: (i) identifier scrambling; (ii) output format
changes; (iii) comments, or debug information.
Replacing the identifier names with mandarin non-alphabetical characters in-
creases the code complexity. For example, in code Listing 18 the SmsManager Class
encrypts the string before sending it over the network. However, the original identi-
fiers names are amenable to reverse engineering. To avoid code inference, oBad Trojan
employs identifier mangling obfuscation in Listing 19.
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1 package iAmDriving{
2 public class LetsNavigate{...}
3 }
4 package iAmConnecting {
5 public class MyBluetoothHandle{..}
6 }
7 package userIsActive{
8 public class MainActivity{...}
9 }
Listing 18: before obfuscation
package d {
public class d { ... }
}
package e {
public class e { ... }
}
package f {
public class f { ...}
}
Listing 19: identifier renam-
ing [Schulz 2014]
Listing 19 replaces the strings by a single character. Identifier mangling reduces
the meta-information by replacing them with random alphabets. Random names do
not carry any information about the object or the behavior. Hence, the interpretation
becomes difficult. Proguard obfuscator within the Android SDK implements a similar
approach. oBad Trojan leverages the identifier mangling with character permutations
of “o, O”, “c, C”, “i, I” and “l, L” in lower and upper case [Minidump 2014]. Listing 20
illustrates the identifier renaming obfuscation.
1 public final class CcoCIcIf {
2 private static final byte [ ] COcocOlo;
3 private static boolean CcoCIcI;
4 private static long OoCOocll;
5 private static long OoCOocll;
6 private static String cOIcOOo;
7 private static final OoCOocll lOIlloc;
8 private static ArrayList occcclc;
9 private static final occccl coclClII;
10 private static Thread ooCclcC;
11 }
Listing 20: oBad Trojan Identifier scrambling Obfuscation [Schulz 2014].
3.4. PREVENTIVE TRANSFORMATIONS
Preventive transformation techniques are employed to evade the commercial debug-
ging and de-compilation tools. Preventive obfuscation takes advantage weak or non-
existent mapping between the high-level language and its corresponding bytecode to
inject illegal, unused or rarely used bytecode. Changes in Java bytecode crashes the
decompiler due to the presence of new instructions. Figure 3 illustrates the preventive
obfuscation techniques.
Anti Debugging: This technique is a preventive obfuscation that inserts some val-
idation code to identify the presence of a debugger. Once it identifies being executed in
the debugger, the app behaves benign without revealing the malicious behavior.
Anti De-compilation: The transformation prevents reverse engineering of Dalvik
or Java bytecode to high-level programming constructs. The obfuscator employs goto
constructs valid with the bytecode which are not a part of Java language.
Bytecode Encryption: Bytecode Encryption changes the structure of data. Low
et al. [Low 1998] suggest that encryption methods as an alternative to defeat decom-
pilation. Code transformers encrypt the data with innovative methods to decrypt the
encrypted content.
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Android Manifest Obfuscation: Another technique to obfuscate data in Android
application is Manifest Obfuscation. However, Android middleware verifies the mani-
fest meta-data; some obfuscation techniques have been observed aiming at producing
errors during the binary decoding [Schulz 2014]. In the process of APK file creation, the
manifest is compiled into a binary XML file. DexGuard [DexGuard 2015a], the com-
mercial extension of ProGuard [Android 2015b] can obfuscate and optimize the binary
XML files to avoid detection.
String Encryption: String Obfuscation hides the plain text strings that reveal sen-
sitive information. The sensitive plaintext information can be misused. The strings
must be available in plaintext form at runtime. Hence, the developer prefer to encrypt
the plaintext string. String Obfuscation can be employed with an invertible encryption
function employing AES, DES or XOR encryption. Resultant output replaces the orig-
inal plaintext. The process generates a byte sequence corresponding to each string as
a data array stored in a private static class field. The strings are brought back to the
original state at runtime. Hence, the strings are retrieved as plaintext when required.
Dynamic analysis is useful as it extracts runtime information. Code listings 21 and
22 illustrates code snippet before and after string encryption. The encrypted code con-
verts readable string information into an array of strings with ASCII characters and
obscures the code readability.
1 //original code
2 public void onClick(DialogInterface arg1,
3 int arg2) {
4 try { Class.forName("java.lang.System")
5 .getMethod("exit", Integer.TYPE)
6 .invoke(null, Integer.valueOf(0));
7 return;
8 } catch:(Throwable throwable) {
9 throw throwable.getCause();
10 }
11 }
Listing 21: before encryp-
tion [Strazzare 2014]
1 //String encryption
2 public void onClick(DialogInterface arg1,
3 int arg2)
4 { try {
5 Class.forName(COn. Ł (GCOn. [0xA],
6 COn. [0x09], GCOn. [0xB]))
7 .getMethod(COn. Ł (i1, i2, i2 | 6),
8 Integer.TYPE)
9 .invoke(null, Integer.valueOf(0));
10 return;
11 } catch:(Throwable throwable) {
12 throw throwable.getCause();
13 }
14 }
Listing 22: string en-
crypted [Strazzare 2014]
Bad Code Injection: Figure 5 illustrates recursive goto sequences with an indi-
rect recursion. This transformation thwarts the existing static analysis tools (disas-
semblers, decompilers) by inserting bytecode statements not available with high-level
language.
Fig. 5: Bad code injection.
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Some instructions may be valid in Java. However, their corresponding Dalvik in-
structions may not be available. For example, Java language does not have goto con-
struct. However, when a loop or switch constructs are converted to Dalvik, the goto
statement is generated. Hence, goto can be injected in the Dalvik bytecode. In partic-
ular, a dummy method with recursive goto statements can be used.
Reflection: Reflection is a powerful Java programming technique to extend
additional functionality such as verifying backward compatibility or dynamically
load methods. It is used in debugging and testing tools [Wognsen et al. 2014]. Java
Reflection application programming interface (API) allows a program to access the
class information during execution to [Wognsen 2012; Wognsen et al. 2014]: (1) create
new objects; (2) invoke a method; or (3) modify the code control-flow. Reflection can
be alternatively employed as data obfuscation technique. Code listings 23 and 24
illustrate the importance of reflection obfuscation.
1 // A Standard Call in Java
2 Crypto cryptModule = new Crypto();
3 privateKey = cryptModule.getPrivateKey();
Listing 23: before obfuscation
1 // Invoke using reflection
2 Object reflectedClassInstance =
3 Class.forName (pe.mnit.secureApp.Crypto).
4 newInstance();
5
6 Method methodToReflect =
7 reflectedClassInstance.getClass().
8 getMethod(getPrivateKey);
9
10 Object invokeResult = methodToReflect.invoke
11 (reflectedClassInstance);
Listing 24: code reflection obfuscation
Reflections is used in Android for a variety of purposes such as:
(1) Invoking hidden API methods: Certain Android framework features are inten-
tionally hidden from the developers during compilation. The hidden API may not
support all Android devices, or the stable version is yet to be made public.
(2) Providing backward compatibility: New Android versions incorporate addi-
tional features and get released in the incremental higher versions. A developer
may use reflection to verify if a particular feature present in older version exists
with the new version. If available, then only calls that feature/method.
(3) Interacting with JSON data: Data from server is loaded in JavaScript Object
Notation format (JSON) from the web. Hence, it is parsed using reflections in An-
droid.
(4) Libraries: Native libraries can be loaded in an APK using reflection API. Some
applications employ custom native libraries for improved performance.
3.5. Repackaging Popular Apps
Repackaging Android APK is a popular practice among the malware authors. In par-
ticular, malware authors reverse engineer the popular apps. The app is reverse en-
gineering, malware payload is inserted and released at less monitored Android third-
party app markets. In [Crussell et al. 2013], authors discuss a set of methods to replace
the app developer library by the plagiarist ad-libraries to divert the advertisement rev-
enues. Thus, a developer is robbed off the advertisement revenue.
Repackaging is the one of the widely used Obfuscation technique em-
ployed by malware authors on Android platform [Gibler et al. 2013]. Zhou et
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al. [Zhou and Jiang 2012; Zhou et al. 2013] reported 86% repackaged malware among
the 1260 Android Malware Genome dataset. Another study reported 5-13%
repackaged and malicious applications among the well-known six third-party app
stores [Zhou and Jiang 2012]. The other third-party app stores do not have robust app
verification and vetting. Hence, there is a higher chance of plagiarized and repackaged
apps. Furthermore, authors in [Gibler et al. 2013] reported around 30% plagiarized,
and cloned apps even at the Google Play. The repackaging process typically employs
following steps:
—Download the popular app from the Play store.
—Disassemble the app with apktool [APKTool 2015].
—Develop malicious payload either in Dalvik bytecode or Java source [Android 2013].
—Add the malicious payload inside a popular app.
—Modify the AndroidManifest.xml and/or resources if required.
—Assemble modified source with apktool.
—Distribute repackaged app by with another certificate to the less monitored third-
party markets.
Repackaging is used by malware authors as a technique to evade commercial anti-
malware. Repackaged apps create an imbalance in-app distribution markets, hurt the
developer reputation, and inflict monetary loss to the developers [Faruki et al. 2015;
Huang et al. 2013]. Malware authors also employ repacking to divert the advertise-
ment revenues by replacing the original advertisements with their own. AndroRAT
APK Binder [Symantec 2015] repackages and generates trojanized version of popu-
lar, legitimate app appending remote access functionality. The adversary can remotely
force the infected device to send premium-rate SMS, make voice calls, access the de-
vice location, record video and audio and access the device files without the device user
knowledge.
3.6. CUSTOM OBFUSCATION TECHNIQUES
Malware authors have been very active in developing customized obfuscation
to defeat the anti-malware. In this section, we discuss following custom tech-
niques primarily used by malware writers to protect the malicious code. Apvrille et
al. [Apvrille and Nigam 2016] list some interesting techniques used by malware au-
thors to defeat application analysis and reverse engineering:
Using very long class names: Decompilers tend to crash when the class names
are too long or written in non-ASCII format [Schulz 2012a]. Few malicious apps
have demonstrated use of very long class names to defeat reverse engineering tools
Android/Mseg.A!tr.spy [Strazzere able] reported in the wild has successfully
evaded commercial anti-malware with this technique.
Hide Packages, JAR inside raw resources: Malware developers hide the
malicious executable package inside the resource files to avoid code inspection.
For example, Android/SmsZombie.A!tr hides malicious package within a jpeg
file a33.jpg, in the assets directory [Apvrille 2014]. Android/Gamex.A!tr con-
ceal an encrypted malicious package within asset logos.png, again an image
file [Apvrille 2014]. Table II enlists interesting malicious apps using the discussed
techniques [Apvrille and Nigam 2016].
NOP to modify bytecode control flow: No Operation (NOP) is an assembly lan-
guage instruction, that does nothing at all. A sequence of NOP instructions wastes the
CPU cycles and adds to the code complexity. Malware authors can leverage NOP in-
struction to modify the bytecode flow to hide the actual control flow of the program.
Inserting the NOP instruction changes the syntax structure, a common technique to
evade anti-malware. This approach is easy and used by quite a few malware authors.
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Path Obfuscation: Path obfuscation is used to achieve the cloning transforma-
tion [Frederick 2002]. The idea is to change the path such that there are different
methods, but the same meaning. This technique is used within URLs to obfuscate the
HTTP-based attacks [Frederick 2002].
Hiding bytecode:Hiding bytecode obfuscates APK with a variable length fill-array-
data-payload instruction to hide the original bytecode [Schulz 2015]. This technique
can be detected by looking for Dalvik bytecode employing goto obfuscation followed
by fill-array-data opcode, illustrated in Figure 6. The bytecode is hidden in the fill-
array-data which remains invisible to the disassemblers.
Fig. 6: Hiding bytecode in the array of fill-array-data.
Android malware name Purpose of Obfuscation
Gamex.A!tr The asset log-os.png is a ZIP. However, it has the capability
of being a valid ZIP file (for instance, when XOR’ed with the
right key).
SmsZombie.A!tr Hides malicious package in a33.jpg.
DroidCoupon.A!tr The Rage Against the Cage (root exploit, commonly used to root
Android phones) is hidden inside a png image in the resources.
Table II: hidden malware payload inside APK resource.
String table: A string table can be used to hide strings. In this technique, a mali-
cious app builds a string table as an array of characters. The table hides suspicious
strings. The reverse engineering tools fails to identify strings. Listing 25 illustrate use
of string table as an obfuscation technique.
1 package Eg9Vk5Jan;
2 class x18nAzukp {
3 final private static char[][] OGqHAYqtswt8g;
4 static x18nAzukp()
5 { v0 = new char[][48];
6 v1 = new char[49];
7 v1 = {97, 0, 110, 0, 100, 0, 114, 0, 111, ...
8 v0[0] = v1;}
9 protected static String rLGAEh9gGn73A(int p2) {
10 return new String(Eg9Vk5Jan.x18nAzukp.
11 OGqHAYqtswt8g[p2]);
12 } ...
13 new StringBuilder(x18nAzukp.rLGAEgGn73A(43))
Listing 25: String Table
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Fig. 7: APK Obfuscation and optimization methodology.
4. CUSTOM CODE OBFUSCATION TOOLS
Obfuscation techniques, though not invincible, are very popular among malware writ-
ers. Figure 7 illustrates the steps employed by obfuscation methods to transform and
optimize the code.
4.1. Proguard 1
Proguard obfuscator is a part of Android software development kit
(SDK) [Android 2015b]. Proguard is a Java source code transformer. Google rec-
ommends Proguard to protect Android APK. Proguard has an in-built optimizer,
shrinker and a weak obfuscator. The Obfuscator “tool removes unused or unnecessary
code, merges the identical code blocks, employs peep hole optimization, removes de-
bug information, renames objects and restructures the original code” [Strazzare 2014].
1 //original code listing
2 public static String exec(String cmd,
3 Boolean root) {
4 BufferReader mybufferReader;
5 DataStream testdataOutputStream;
6 Process process;
7 String string = "sh";
8 if(root.booleanValue()) {
9 string = "su";
10 }
11 StringBuild teststringBuilder =
12 new StringBuilder();
13 try {
14 process = Runtime.getRuntime()
15 .exec(string);
16 dataOutputStream = new DataOutputStream
17 (process.getOutputStream());
18 dataOutputStream.writeBytes(cmd + "\n");
19 mybufferReader = new BufferedReader(
20 new InputStreamReader(process
21 .getInputStream()));
22 }
Listing 26: before obfusca-
tion [Strazzare 2014]
1 // Proguarded output
2
3 public static String a(String arg6,
4 Boolean arg7) {
5 Process process;
6 String string = "mksh";
7 if(arg7.booleanValue()) {
8 string = "su";
9 }
10
11 testStringBuilder stringBuilder =
12 new StringBuilder();
13 try {
14
15 process = Runtime.getRuntime()
16 .exec(string);
17
18 DataOutputStream dataOutputStream =
19 new DataOutputStream(process
20 .getOutputStream());
21 dataOutputStream
22
23 .writeBytes(String.valueOf(arg6) + "\n");
24
25 BufferedReader bufferedReader =
26 new BufferedReader(
27 }
Listing 27: Proguarded
code [Strazzare 2014]
1http://proguard.sourceforge.net (accessed August, 2016.)
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4.2. Allatori2
Allatori [Allatori 2015] is a commercial product from Smardec. Besides identifier
renaming, Allatori tool can also modify the source code. Allatori is a code optimizer,
shrinker, obfuscator and a watermarking tool. The tool obscures the loops within the
program such that reverse engineering tools are easily evaded. Such an approach in-
creases the code size and makes the program logic less readable. Moreover, Allatori
also encrypts the strings and decrypts them at runtime. Allatori has the following
notable features: (i) reduced .dex file size; (ii) improves APK execution speed; (iii) de-
creases memory usage; (iv) removes debug code; and (v) employs simple obfuscation.
4.3. DexGuard3
DexGuard [DexGuard 2015a] is a professional code optimizer and obfuscator devel-
oped by Eric Lafortune. It performs code optimization, code shrinking, and encryption.
Dexguard converts the class and methods names into non-ASCII values and strings
are encrypted with the encryption algorithms. DexGuard has following features in ad-
dition to Proguard: (i) Reflection obfuscation at runtime; (ii) Encrypt strings within an
array; (iii) assets, resource and library encryption; (iv) encrypts Java class names; and
(v) identifies APK tampering.
1 // original code
2
3 public void onClick(
4 DialogInterface arg3, int arg4)
5 {
6 System.exit(0);
7
8 } .
Listing 28: before obfuscation
1 // Dexguard obfuscated code
2 public void onClick(
3 DialogInterface arg7, int arg8) {
4 try {
5
6 Class.forName
7 ("java.lang.System").getMethod("exit",Integer.
8 TYPE).invoke(null, Integer.valueOf(0));
9 return;
10 } catch:(Throwable throwable) {
11 throw throwable.getCause();
12 }
13 }
Listing 29: Dexguarded [Strazzare 2014]
4.4. dalvik-obfuscator4
dalvik-obfuscator is an open-source bytecode transformation tool [Schulz 2012b].
The analyst must provide an APK file as input to obtain the obfuscated app version.
Dalvik-obfuscator employs the popular junk byte injection approach on the x86 plat-
form. Dalvik-obfuscator is composed of a set of tools/scripts to obfuscate and manipu-
late .dex files. The obfuscator iterates through all the methods, insert junk bytes and
unconditional branch in the code block, to ensure it is never executed.
4.5. APKfuscator5
APKfuscator is a dead code injection obfuscator [Strazzere 2015]. Available as an
open-source, APKfuscator employs quite a few variations of dead code injection. APK-
fuscator functions on bytecode level and leverages the Unix filesystem restriction that
does not allow a class name to exceed 255 characters. APKfuscator employs three vari-
ations of dead code injection: (i) insert illegal opcodes; (ii) use legitimate opcodes into
2http://www.allatori.com (accessed August, 2016.)
3 https://www.guardsquare.com/dexguard (accessed August, 2016.)
4https://github.com/thuxnder/dalvik-obfuscator (accessed August, 2016.)
5https://github.com/strazzere/APKfuscator (accessed August, 2016.)
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“bad” objects; and (iii) inject code inside the .dex header by exploiting a discrepancy
between the claims of the official .dex documentation and DEX verifier.
5. CODE PACKERS AND PROTECTORS
Android code Packers insert new malicious DEX file and encrypt the classes.dex
in the existing .dex file within an APK. The new .dex is decrypted in mem-
ory during runtime using DexClassLoader, a Java class loader [Google 2016;
Apvrille and Nigam 2016; SecNeo 2015]. Packers were developed for Android platform
to protect the legitimate app from unwanted tampering and modifications. However,
malware developers use packers to obfuscate the dalvik bytecode and evade anti-
malware scanners.
5.1. Code Packers
Packing encrypts the executable code to prevent static analysis. The unpacker rou-
tine brings the code in readable form. Malware developers employ executable code
packers to evade reverse engineering of malicious DEX. The runtime unpacking rou-
tine brings the code into its original form. The code protectors can also be used in
conjunction with existing obfuscation techniques to harden static analysis. Figure 8
illustrates working of code packers.
Fig. 8: Code Packing steps.
APK Protect6: is a professional code packing tool with anti-debug, anti-decompile
and anti-disassembly support [Protect 2015]. The packer performs code obfuscation
with string encryption with Base64 encoding. It employs Java reflections to load the
code dynamically. APK Protect has following features: (i) debugger detection; (ii) app
encryption; (iii) code reflections; (iv) anti-debugging; (v) anti-disassembly; and (vi) anti-
decompilation.
HoseDex2Jar7: is an executable packer to encrypt .dex, repackage encrypted file,
and store inside 112 header bytes of the target .dex. Figure 9 illustrate code packing
procedure with HoseDex2Jar. The code packer performs: (i) .dex repackaging; and (ii)
code encryption.
6https://sourceforge.net/projects/apkprotect/ (accessed August, 2016.)
7 https://github.com/strazzere/dehoser (accessed August, 2016.)
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Fig. 9: HoseDex2Jar Packer.
Bangcle:8 is an online APK packing tool [SecNeo 2015]. The developer must register
at the Bangcle and use Bangcle Assistant tool to upload the package. The app must be
uploaded with the Keystore to retrieve the protected APK. The packing process changes
the APK name, inserts new assets, native libraries and modifies the Android manifest.
Figure 10 illustrates the code packing procedure. Bangcle packer provides (i) online
APK wrapping; (ii) resists reverse engineering; (iii) online anti-debugging, anti-tamper
and anti-decompilation service.
Fig. 10: Functioning of Bangcle Packer.
PANGXIE9: is a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) packer armed with anti-debugging and anti-
tampering techniques [Strazzare 2014]. The packer encrypts the .dex bundled inside
the assets of an APK. Though, PANGXIE evades static analysis, the obfuscator in-
creases the APK size. Figure 11 illustrates the code unpacking procedure based on
runtime execution.
8https://www.crunchbase.com/organization/bangbang-security/entity (accessed August, 2016.):
9 http://www.packers.com/ (accessed August, 2016.)
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Fig. 11: Unpacking procedure during Dynamic analysis.
5.2. Comparison of Obfuscation and Protection Techniques
In the following, we evaluate the effectiveness of Packers based on following at-
tributes illustrated in Table III.
Code Obfuscation: This technique prevents the analysis of the code either at
source code or bytecode level [Collberg and Thomborson 2002]. The Android Inte-
grated Development Environment (IDE) has Proguard, an in-built obfuscator to trans-
form the Java class names, fields, and method names [Android 2015b]. Addition-
ally, the persistent methods like control-flow obfuscation, reorder program flow, read-
able string encryption, and dynamic code loading has been employed by recent mal-
ware [Rastogi et al. 2014; Zheng et al. 2012]. Furthermore, the app developers also use
Java Reflection methods and invoke the native code functionality using Java Native
Interface (JNI) to hinder static analysis.
Dynamic Code Modification: Android user apps, developed in Java are converted
to Dalvik bytecode using Dx tool [Google 2016; Lin 2015], part of Android SDK. Dalvik
Virtual Machine (DVM) verifies the bytecode, and executes it in the VM. It is difficult
for a programmer to modify bytecode from VM during runtime. Malware developers
use Java Native Interface (JNI) methods to modify and load the bytecode at runtime
DVM [Qian et al. 2014]. ART pre-compiles the .dex file as oat in the ELF format. To
avoid precompilation, the native code modifies the instructions of .dex and .oat data
structures.
Dynamic Code Loading: Android permits loading of external .jar or a .dex at
runtime. The executable code appears different compared to its static visuals. Malware
authors leverage this facility by encrypting the malicious executable, then decrypting
and loading them in the VM at runtime.
Anti-debugging: Android kernel has in-built GNU debugger (gdb) to attach pro-
cess for debugging. Packers get attached to Ptrace [Lin 2015] tool to evade gdb under
the assumption that only a single process can be attached to the target process for mon-
itoring. Hence, the gdb cannot attach itself to the APK; preventing the APK debugging.
Advanced Packers identify Java Debug Wire Protocol (JDWP) threads being attached
to an APK. Furthermore, the Packers can identify themselves being monitored within
emulated environment.
Table III illustrates a comparison of the crucial methods prevalent among the lead-
ing Packers based upon their properties. The Android Packers are a new phenomenon
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and evolving quickly. We examined known malicious apps on portals and packed with
stand alone Packers during October and November 2015. Table III shows that all of the
Packers use one or more code obfuscation techniques and append shared library. The
comparison shows that few Packers support ART. Except Bangcle and Ijiami, other
packers are not equipped to perform runtime modifications.
Packer Protection Techniques
Packer
Code
Obfuscation
Dynamic
Code
Loading
Dynamic
Code
Modification
Debugger
Detection
Append
shared
Libraries
Additional
Class
insertion
DVM
Support
ART
Support
APKProtect ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗
Ali ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✗
Baidu ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Bangle ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
Ijiami ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔
HoseDex2jar ✔ ✔ ✗ ✔ ✗ ✗ ✔ ✗
Pangxie ✔ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✗ ✔ ✔ ✗
Table III: Comparing packer protection methods
6. ANDROID BYTECODE ANALYSIS
In this section, we discuss various Dalvik bytecode de-obfuscation tools and tech-
niques. To de-obfuscate an APK, the reverse engineered bytecode must be available.
Hence, we discuss the Dalvik bytecode, as it is the nearest readable intermediate code
for disassembly and analysis [Faruki et al. 2014]. Figure 12 illustrates the process of
bytecode extraction and analysis of a normal Android APK file. This process is followed
by analysts and malware authors for their respective purpose.
6.1. Bytecode and De-Obfuscation Tools
In the following, we briefly discuss open-source and commercial de-obfuscation tools.
Dexdump: Dexdump is a part of the Android software development kit
(SDK) [Android 2015a]. Dexdump is a Dalvik executable (dex) file dissection tool that
can be used to disassemble Dalvik bytecode. Dexdump is a linear sweep disassembler
that finds a valid instruction at the last byte of the instruction being analyzed. Linear
sweep disassembler can be circumvented easily by inserting the junk bytes to prevent
the disassembly.
Smali: Smali is a Dalvik bytecode assembler [smali 2015]. The package contains
baksmali to disassemble the assembled code. Hence, both smali and baksmali can
be used to disassemble, modify and reassemble the Android apps [DexGuard 2015b].
Baksmali performs recursive disassembly by following the address of jump towards
the current instruction.
Androguard: Desnos proposed Androguard, an open-source static analysis tool to
reverse engineer the APK files [Desnos 2015]. Androguard has a recursive disassembler
and semantic analysis methods to identify similarity, dissimilarity, call graph analysis
and signature of malicious apps. It provides a graphical preview of call graphs to assist
the human analyst to detect cloned and repackaged APK files.
APKInspector: APKInspector is static, bytecode analysis tool. APKInspector lever-
ages Ded [ded 2015], Smali/Baksmali [smali 2015], APKtool [APKTool 2015] and An-
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droguard [Desnos 2015] to reverse engineer APK bytecode. APKInspector performs:
(i) meta-data analysis; (ii) sensitive permission usage; (iii) generates bytecode control-
flow graph; (iii) generates call-graph with call-in and call-out structures.
dex2jar: dex2jar is a disassembler to parse both the dex and optimized dex files,
providing a lightweight API to access [Dex2Jar 2013]. dex2jar can also convert dex
to a jar file, by re-targeting the Dalvik bytecode into Java bytecode. Moreover, it is
possible to re-assemble the jar into a dex after modifications.
Dare: Dare project aims at re-targeting Dalvik bytecode within classes.dex to
traditional .class files using strong type inference algorithm [Octaeu et al. 2015].
This .class files can be further analyzed using a range of traditional tech-
niques developed for Java applications, including the de-compilers. Octeau et
al. [Octeau et al. 2012] demonstrated that Dare is 40% more accurate than dex2jar.
Dedexer: Dedexer tool [Paller 2015] disassembles the classes.dex into Jasmin,
an intermediate code format. Furthermore, it creates a separate file for each class
to maintain the package directory structure for easy readability [Wognsen 2012;
Wognsen et al. 2014]. However, unlike the apktool, it cannot re-assemble the inter-
mediate disassembled class files.
JEB: JEB [jeb 2013] is a leading professional Android reverse-engineering software
available on Windows, Linux, and Macintosh. The GUI interactive decompiler ana-
lyzes reversed malware app content. App information such as manifest, resources, cer-
tificates, literal strings can be examined in Java source by providing an easy navigation
through the cross-references. JEB converts Dalvik bytecode to Java utilizing Dalvik
bytecode semantics. JEB has de-obfuscator for obfuscated bytecode [Dex2Jar 2013;
APKTool 2015]. JEB supports plugins by allowing access to the decompiled Java code
Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) through API. The feature is useful to perform custom
analysis.
IDA Pro: IDA Pro [HexRays 2015] is a commercial recursive disassembler popu-
lar for x86 platform. The IDA 6.0 onwards supports the Android Dalvik bytecode
disassembly. IDA has a complete GUI with options to extend the functionality with
supported API plugins to extend analysis functionality. IDA Pro has an additional ca-
pability to disassemble specific parts of the code in a file selected by the user. Dalvik
bytecode can be represented as a graph making it easy to follow the control flow within
a program.
Dexter: Dexter is a free online analysis service [Labs 2015] and static analysis tool
to process an input APK file. It provides rich information about: (i) APK permission; (ii)
obfuscated code and packages; and (iv) mapping between broadcast receivers and the
data-store.
Dexguard:Dexguard is a set of scripts to perform automated strings de-obfuscation
and recovery of the dex file [Bremer 2015]. This tool is a mix of static and dynamic
analysis consisting of (i) dex File reader; (ii) Dalvik disassembler; (iii) Dalvik emulator;
and (iv) dex File parser.
Radare2: Radare2 [QuantumG and Emmerik 2014b] is an interactive byte-
code disassembly and analysis tool with precise control during reverse engi-
neering procedure. Radare2 decompiles the code using open-source decompiler
boomerang [QuantumG and Emmerik 2014a]. This tool is a recursive disassembler
that allows a user to specify starting address for decompilation. The hybrid approach
makes Radare2 more efficient against smart obfuscation techniques in comparison to
other approaches.
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Fig. 12: Disassembly of an APK file
6.2. Stealth Obfuscation
Malware writers employ different code protection techniques to delay the malware
being reverse engineered. Android malware is following the footsteps of Windows mal-
ware evolution with the recent addition of code packing tools. The Packers are used to
generate unseen variants of known malware apps, further increasing the pressure on
signature-based commercial anti-malware. In this section, we discuss the techniques
that are possibly useful to hide the malicious code. Bremere et al. in [bremer 2013]
demonstrated the possibility of bytecode injection inside any class having a virtual
function. Such techniques can be used by attackers to serve the evil intents like:
(1) To develop a benign app capable of bytecode interpretation and loading.
(2) To read the bytecode from APK or a remote host.
(3) To inject the malicious bytecode inside a benign app.
At present, this technique is limited to return integer values. However, malware au-
thors can misuse the extended version to inject malicious bytecode at runtime. Authors
in [Apvrille 2013a] demonstrated a Proof-of-Concept code to hide the Dalvik methods
against the reverse engineering tools. Furthermore, they presented the methods to de-
tect such hidden methods. Malware authors can place the malicious logic within such
hidden methods and evade anti-malware. However, the authors also developed the
Hidex tool [Apvrille 2013b] to detect invisible methods.
In [Apvrille 2014], the authors developed several methods capable of manipulating
the AES or DES algorithm output and represented the malware payload as custom
PNG, JPG or a sound file. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated that such payloads
remain undetected with the anti-malware. Malware authors may well be interested
in hiding malware APK inside the assets or resource folders. Besides, malware author
can develop a genuine APK including the customized JPG as its asset. The malicious
app loads the asset at runtime to execute malicious behavior. Following protection,
obfuscation, and optimization techniques are interesting:
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(1) Using Proguard from Android SDK to protect apps proprietary logic: Proguard
performs variable renaming, leaving the class name un-obfuscated. Hence, it is
easy to identify the obfuscated class as its methods are modified but the class name
remains un-obfuscated.
(2) Strings encoded with Base64: malware authors exploit various forms of string
transformations such as string encryption using arrays, non-ASCII character re-
placement or, hides resource files inside the strings encrypted with Base64 encod-
ing methods. Thus, the binary data can also be hidden as Base64 encoded strings.
(3) Dynamic loading: it allows the external code to be downloaded at runtime in an
APK. This technique has also been used by malware authors as discussed in Ta-
ble IV. For the initial automation phase, its presence was only detected by pattern
matching check of the classes for the packages.
(4) Native Code: identifies the presence of native code by filtering the class definition
table to verify the usage of application code accessing the system related informa-
tion and resources or interfacing with the runtime environment.
(5) Reflection: the classes definition table was filtered for the presence of the Java
reflection packages for access to methods, fields and classes.
(6) Header size: bytecode injection inside the classes.dex header can be exploited
by taking advantage of discrepancy between the dalvik bytecode documentation
and the file.
(7) Encoding: it verifies the presence of mixed endianness with a flag check.
(8) Cryptographic code: javax.crypto and java.security.spec packages provide
facilities to implement encryption/decryption in classes and interface application
to study misuse of cryptographic functionality.
Malware authors have misused the existing code protection and obfuscation meth-
ods to evade the commercial anti-malware. Table IV summarizes malware obfusca-
tion chronology and illustrates the methods and tools used by to obfuscate APK files.
Malware writers leveraged custom encryption, string encryption, and URL encryp-
tion. They encrypted network communications and encodedURLs. The recentmalware
apps exploit sophisticated techniques like steganography and code obfuscation tools to
harden the malware reverse engineering.
In 2013, malware developer used Dexguard to evade the anti-malware. The mal-
ware writers pushed Javascript payloads inside the resource folder and encrypted non-
Dalvik code in the obfuscated apps. Some malware samples developed in the year 2014
employed online Packing tool services apart from string encryption and obfuscation.
Additionally, malware writer encrypted data.xml files inside APK archive to evade
anti-malware and harden reverse engineering. Dendroid [Rogers 2014] is a stealth re-
mote administration toolkit employing hidden behavior sending premium-rate SMS,
voice calls, recording audio video without user consent. The Trojan evades the exist-
ing commercial anti-malware techniques. Elish et al. [Elish et al. 2015] proposed user-
intention based anomaly detector to detect such stealth malicious apps.
7. EXISTING SURVEYS AND RELATED WORK
Shabtai et al. [Shabtai et al. 2010] proposed an Android threat taxonomy on An-
droid platform. In [Vidas et al. 2011], the authors survey different attack vectors, and
discuss the attack taxonomy on Android. In [Zhou and Jiang 2012], authors, carried
out Android malware characterization of 49 Android malware families. The authors
reported simple obfuscation techniques employed by malware such as Anserver, and
Bgserv. Enk et al. [Enck et al. 2011] discussed the existing research, primarily tar-
geting Android platform. The authors reviewed the Android platform security and
app analysis methods. Furthermore, the authors discussed limitations of analysis
techniques like rule-based detection, ex-filtration of sensitive information and inter-
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Malware Year
Obfuscation/Encryption/
Protection/OptimizationMethod
Tool/Technique used
SlemBunk 2015 Code Obfuscation Class, Method and Field Obfuscation
Trojan.Dropper.RealShell 2015 Custom APK Obfuscation Stores files in Assets Folder
Dendroid.A!tr 2014 Obfuscated with Dexguard Dexguard Tool
SmsSend.ND 2014 Packed with APKProtect Packer Code Packing Tool
Freejar.B 2014 Packed with Bangcle Packing service Online code packing Service
RuSMS.AO 2014 Strings obfuscated, using Adobe Airpush like name Custom string encryption
SmsSpy.HW!tr.spy 2014 “data.xml” file is encrypted with Blowfish algorithm Custom symmetric encryption
Agent.BH!tr.spy 2014 Sends encrypted emails using TL security Custom encryption
Rmspy.A!tr 2013 Obfuscated with Dexguard Dexguard obfuscator
oBad 2013 Obfuscated with Dexguard Dexguard obfuscator
Android.Ginmaster 2013 Custom String encryption Custom encryption
Android/GinMaster.L 2013 String obfuscation with string table in array Custom encryption
Stels.A!tr 2013 Custom encoding URL text with Base64 Custom encoding
Pincer.A!tr.spy 2013 Caeser cipher to hide text and telephone No. Symmetric encryption algorithm
GinMaster.B 2013 Encrypts IMEI, IMSI and strings with Triple DES Custom symmetric encryption
FakeDefend.A!tr 2013 Encrypted fake infections with AES algorithm Block cipher encryption
FakePlay.B!tr 2013 Non Dalvik, Javascript payload in resources Non Dalvik code encryption
SmsSend.N 2012 Obfuscated with Proguard Proguard obfuscator
Plankton.B!tr 2012 Obfuscated with Proguard Proguard obfuscator
DroidKungFu.D!tr 2012 Obfuscated with Proguard Proguard obfuscator
FakeInst.A!tr.dial 2012 PNG file stores SMS text body and phone numbers Steganography
NotCompatible.Android!tr.bdr 2012 Encrypted C&C URL in resource folder with AES Block Cipher encryption
DroidKungFu.G!tr 2012 ELF payload stored as “mylogo.jpg ” Non Dalvik code encryption
Pjapps.A!tr 2011 Encoded URL URL encryption
Android/SmsSpy.HW!tr 2011 Encrypted with symmetric key Blowfish algorithm Symmetric encryption
Android/RootSmart 2011 Symmetric key encryption DES, AES and Blowfish Block cipher encryption
BaseBridge.A!tr 2011 String encrypted in an array Encrypted strings
Geinimi.A!tr 2011 Encrypted network communication & obfuscated codes custom encryption and obfuscation
Table IV: Malware Obfuscation chronology [Apvrille 2014; Apvrille and Nigam 2016;
Apvrille 2013a; Zhou et al. 2012; Inc. 2013; SecNeo 2015]
application privilege escalation attacks. However, the code obfuscation and protection
techniques are not covered in the proposed analysis techniques. The proposed review
gives an extensive insight into the obfuscation techniques and code protection meth-
ods. Furthermore, the review compares various code obfuscation and de-obfuscation
techniques employed by malware authors and anti-malware industry.
Tangil et al. [Suarez-Tangil et al. 2014] discuss the evolution of mobile malware,
their infection and distribution techniques and detail them with different case stud-
ies. The authors survey the greyware and malicious app detection techniques between
2010 and 2013. Furthermore, the authors discuss various research problems, briefly
discussing the impact of malware detection. In [Faruki et al. 2015], authors discuss
the Android security issues, malware penetration and various defense methods for
app analysis and mobile platform security. Furthermore, the authors briefly review
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obfuscation techniques. However, they concentrate more on malicious repackaging, a
common problem with Android apps.
In [Kovacheva 2013], authors focus on developing efficient Dalvik bytecode obfusca-
tion techniques. They study the Google Play apps to identify the feasibility of availing
the source code with reverse engineering tools. Authors propose efficient obfuscator
design to defeat the existing de-obfuscation tools (i.e., smali, dedexer, ded). Schulz
et al. [Schulz 2014] performed Android bytecode de-obfuscation feasibility. The au-
thors evaluated analysis methods to automate de-obfuscation of Dexguard obfuscated
code. Rastogi et al. [Rastogi et al. 2014] evaluated commercial anti-malware against
trivial code obfuscation techniques. Faruki et al. [Faruki et al. 2014] compare the per-
formance of anti-malware, and static analysis tools against popular x86 transforma-
tion attacks. Harrison et al. [Harrison 2015] investigate the effect of code obfuscation
on Android. They evaluate the limitations of reverse engineering tools against app
repackaging.
Schrittwieser et al. [Schrittwieser et al. 2016] evaluate smartphone code protection
techniques. The authors analyze and evaluate software de-obfuscation techniques. The
survey is more general targeting software protection techniques and analysis methods.
However, our target is, Android specific obfuscation techniques.
The proposed review is a comprehensive discussion on source code obfuscation,
code protection, Android specific obfuscation, and code protection tools. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate code protection and mal-
ware obfuscation techniques for the Android platform. We discuss Collberg taxon-
omy [Collberg and Thomborson 2002], and expand source code, and bytecode obfus-
cation taxonomy.
8. FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Malware such as Android/DroidCoupon.A!r, and AndroidSmsZombie.A!.tr
hide the malicious native payloads as JPG, or PNG
files [Axelle Apvrille 2015], [Apvrille and Nigam 2016]. However, the assets are
payloads just named as graphic files. Making fake payload with such tricks is
prevalent on Android malware applications. Furthermore, authors in [Apvrille 2014]
developed a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) AngeCryption [Apvrille 2014] to illustrate the
possibility of encrypting any given input stored as an image (JPG, PNG). In particular,
an attacker can develop a benign APK file to hide a malicious image inside resource
or asset to evade the anti-malware.
The unsuspected image containing malicious payload can be used to execute the
malicious code. Such an attack may not be noticed at all, as the APK does not contain
obfuscated, protected or wrapped content.
AngeCryption has demonstrated a PoC on the latest Android OS version. Thus, a
malicious dex file can be embedded inside an image. Furthermore, it can be obfuscated
with obfuscation tool. The dynamic code loading techniques can be used to execute the
malicious payload. At present, methods to detect such attacks are not available. The
functioning of such payloads cannot be determined before runtime image decryption.
The suggested remedy that we aim to investigate in the future are: (i) keep tab on an
APK that decrypts its resource or assets (such apps can be analyzed dynamically to
identify suspicious behavior); (ii) analyze image decryption to an APK as malicious.
The Android devices have constrained processing and limited storage. Obfuscation
techniques does have an adverse impact on battery consumption. The power manage-
ment is an important issue to identify impact of code level modifications. The Android
Obfuscation has a APK statistical significance [Sahin et al. 2016]. An important future
work is to consider a large set of obfuscated APK empirical evaluation. The same can
be extended to differentmobile OS and devices. Since the developers do not have access
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to tools like CARAT [Peltonen et al. 2016], they cannot identify the impact on energy
consumption. The ability to identify the impact is important for resource constrained
Android devices.
The Android apps have a lot of user interaction and string usage. The malware au-
thors use string encryption and obfuscation techniques to hide the plaintext strings.
In this paper, we have discussed notable malicious apps using such encryption tech-
niques. The authors can implement inter-component communication based inter-
procedural static analysis to reconstruct the encrypted strings to obtain insight into
the string information. Furthermore, authors in [Vsquez et al. 2014] empirically eval-
uated third-party library and obfuscated code usage. To monitor the apps, we propose
to identify the third-party libraries to identify APK cloning. The common use of Google
advertisement network, Facebook ad libraries impacts the categorization. As a part of
future work, we plan to delink the library code from APK files and evaluate obfuscated
code.
The existing academic code obfuscation research is heav-
ily concentrated more towards analysis of obfuscated ma-
licious applications [Zeng et al. 2013] [Armknecht et al. 2013]
[Xing et al. 2014] [Brumley et al. 2013]. The relevant literature evaluates obfus-
cation techniques prominently among malicious applications. The real identification
of obfuscated code among the normal programs which is important for software pro-
tection, is ignored. The non-malicious code reverse engineering is largely unexplored.
Targeting program obfuscation and related techniques for protecting the digital rights
is an interesting future direction. Inspite of the existing research on obfuscation,
evaluation matrices to verify the existing obfuscation technique resilience are not
available. Formal analysis techniques to evaluate obfuscation and de-obfuscation tech-
niques is still not available. Hence, we summarize code obfuscation, de-obfuscation
tools and techniques to understand the effect in isolation. It would be interesting to
combine different class of obfuscation techniques, and evaluate existing de-obfuscation
tools.
9. CONCLUSION
Android, currently the most popular mobile OS platform is eight-year-old. The
growth and commercial value has attracted the research community and malware au-
thors alike. Since the mobile OS is fast evolving, code protection techniques are imple-
mented by the app developers to harden the reverse engineering of the code propriety.
On the other hand, malware authors are using the protection techniques to delay the
code reverse engineering.
In this survey, we address important and specific questions about obfuscation and
code protection techniques on mobile platform. In the existing obfuscation research,
evaluation techniques to assess resilience of obfuscation are still not available. Code
analysis and de-obfuscation techniques have similar limitations. We performed review
of the existing code obfuscation and analysis techniques isolated from one another. We
discuss the details of code protection, optimization and obfuscation technique. Further-
more, we explore custom code protection techniques employed by malware authors to
hide malicious payloads. Obfuscation tools and techniques also depends on availabil-
ity of resources for reverse engineering. Existing tools (e.g., Androguard, JEB, dex2jar)
de-obfuscate custom code examples; however, they fail to decode real-world programs.
The complexity of a problem may outdo the existing resources. Hence, simple obfus-
cation techniques can be effective on resource constrained devices. This is one of the
reason of its popularity among malware authors. The ongoing challenge between code
protection and analysis techniques is growing. Specific obfuscation methods are effec-
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tive in certain situations. Given time and effort, existing obfuscation techniques can
be decoded by human analyst.
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A. OBFUSCATION CODE EXAMPLES
In the following, we discuss FakeInstaller, stealth Android malware em-
ploying different class of obfuscation to evade anti-malware. Listing 30 reverse
engineered code of FakeInstaller [fak 2012; Rasthofer et al. 2015b; jeb 2013]
at line number 1 checks for the presence of emulator, an alibi for develop-
ment environment, or automated analysis system. In line number 9, class and
method names are obfuscated to erase the program semantics. For example, a
random string value “VQIf3AInVTTnSaQI+R]KR9aR9”, is decrypted to Android
android.telephony.SmsManager class. This class is loaded using reflection API
at runtime to evade static analysis. The class sends premium-rate SMS without ex-
plicit user consent. The string “BaRIta*9caBBV]a” is decrypted to SendTextMessage
method. Furthermore, in line number 21 getMethod sends the SMS using the text
from the parameters p1 and p2, declared in line number 1. Here, the use of multi-
ple obfuscation, evasion and code protection techniques successfully evades the static
analysis.
1 // Fakeinstall obfuscated code
2 public static boolean gdadfjrj(String p1,String p2){ [...]
3
4 // Anti analysis check to evade emulator
5
6 if (zhfdghfdgd()) return;
7
8 // Get class instance
9 Class clz = Class.
10
11 forName(gdadfjrj.gdafbj("VQIf3AInVTTnSaQI+R]KR9aR9"));
12 Object localObject = clz.getMethod(gdadfjrj.gdadfjrj("]a9maFVM.9"), newClass[0])
13 .invoke(null, new Object[0]);
14
15 // Get the method name
16 String s = gdadfjrj.gdadfjrj("BaRIta*9caBBV]a");
17
18 // Build parameter list
19 Class c = Class.forName(gdadfjrj.gdadfjrj("VQIf3AInVTTnSaQI+R]KR9aR9"));
20 Class[] arr = new Class[]
21 {nglpsq.cbhgc, nglpsq.cbhgc, nglpsq.cbhgc, c, c };
22
23 // Reflection for invoking the method to send SMS
24 clz.getMethod(s, arr).invoke(localObject, newObject[] { p1, null, p2, null,null });
Listing 30: Fakeinstall Obfuscation [fak 2012; Rasthofer et al. 2015b]
The partial code snippet in Listing 31 is a variant of zitmo [Li et al. 2015]. As illus-
trated, when the SMS is received, framework callback onReceive() is invoked to stop
the broadcast to default SMS app. The abortBroadcast()method aborts the current
broadcast. Then, an intent that carries the SMS is launched inside the MainService,
a background service task. Further, the stored SMS from the intent is accumulated
in the array called “pdus”. The sender identification and message parts are extracted
by getOriginatingAddress() and getMessageBody()methods. Furthermore, the
available values of the “pdus” object are stored inside variables s1, s2 along with
the device Id using method getDeviceId(). The information is encoded inside the
UrlEncodedFormEntity object. Further, the constant URL string is then encoded
with setEntity() to post the data using execute()method.
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1 public class mysmsReceiver extends BroadcastReceiver
2 {
3 public void onReceive (context pcontext, intent pintent)
4 {
5 bundle localBundle=pintent.getExtras();
6 if((localBundle != null)&&(localBundle.containsKey("pdus")))
7 {
8 abortBroadcast();
9 Intent.targetService=newIntent(pcontex, MainService.class);
10 targetService.putExtra("pdus",localBundle);
11 pcontex.startService(ts);
12 }
13 }
14 }
15
16 public class MainService extends Service
17 {
18 public int onStartCommand(Intent pintent, int pintent1, int pintent2){
19 Bundle localBundle=pintent.getBundle("pdus");
20
21 SmsMessage localSMS=SmsMessage.createFromPdu("pdus");
22 String S1 = localSMS.getOriginatingAddress();
23 String S2 = localSMS.getMessageBody();
24 String S3 = localTM.getDeviceId();}
25
26 public void postRequest(urlEncodedFormEntity UEFE)
27 {
28 String address="http://stringthrifty.com/security.jsp";
29 ...
30 DefaultHttpClient().execute(localHP, BRH);
31 }
32 }
Listing 31: SMS Obfuscation & IMEI exfiltration [Li et al. 2015]
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